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Macron seeks third path beyond superpowers

President Emmanuel Macron has sharpened his criticism of Donald Trump and renewed his call for a broader coalition of medium-sized powers, arguing that countries such as France, South Korea, Japan, Canada, Australia, Brazil and India should work more closely together rather than drift into dependency on either Washington or Beijing. The appeal, delivered during his Asia tour, comes as strains in the transatlantic alliance deepen over the war involving Iran, the Strait of Hormuz and Trump’s increasingly abrasive approach to allies.

Speaking in Seoul, Macron said the goal was to avoid becoming “vassals” of two hegemonic powers, presenting his argument as part geopolitical warning and part invitation to build a more autonomous bloc of states that still support rules-based cooperation. Bloomberg reported that he explicitly cast this grouping as a way to stand up to both the dominance of China and what he described as the unpredictability of the United States. The formulation is consistent with a line Macron has pushed for months: that Europe and Asia share an interest in resisting a world order reduced to a binary contest between Washington and Beijing.

The immediate backdrop is a widening dispute with Trump over the Middle East. Macron said on April 2 that forcing open the Strait of Hormuz through military action would be unrealistic, rejecting pressure from Washington for allies to take part in such an operation. He argued that any durable reopening of the waterway, through which about one-fifth of the world’s oil and liquefied natural gas normally passes, would require consultation with Iran rather than a show of force. He also delivered a pointed warning about alliance credibility, saying NATO depends on trust and that constant public doubt hollows out its substance.

That dispute is not confined to abstract strategy. During Macron’s visit to South Korea on April 3, he and President Lee Jae Myung said they would work together to help reopen the Strait of Hormuz and ease the economic disruption caused by the Middle East conflict. The two sides also agreed to deepen cooperation in technology, energy, nuclear fuel supply chains, offshore wind and critical minerals. Those deals gave Macron’s message a practical frame: middle powers, in his telling, should not only talk about autonomy but build it through energy security, industrial partnerships and coordinated diplomacy.

Macron’s remarks also fit a longer-running French doctrine of “strategic autonomy”, the idea that Europe should remain allied with the United States while being able to defend its own interests when Washington’s priorities diverge. He has returned to that theme repeatedly, but the tone has grown sharper since Trump’s return to office. In January, Macron said Europe would not give in to bullies after Trump threatened steep tariffs in an unrelated dispute, signalling that Paris was no longer willing to mask irritation with diplomatic understatement.

There is, however, a political risk in Macron’s framing. Some European governments, particularly those on the continent’s eastern flank, remain wary of language that appears to place the United States and China in the same category. For them, American security guarantees remain indispensable, especially while Russia’s war in Ukraine continues to shape Europe’s threat perceptions. Macron himself acknowledged last year that if the United States and Europe failed to resolve the Ukraine crisis, their credibility in the Indo-Pacific would be weakened, an admission that European ambitions abroad are still tied to security performance much closer to home.

Asian governments may also hear Macron’s proposal with caution as well as interest. South Korea and Japan depend heavily on the United States for security, even as both seek more room to manage trade, technology and supply-chain exposure to China. Macron’s pitch may resonate most where governments want hedging strategies without formal non-alignment. That makes his language politically useful, but converting it into a durable coalition would be harder than assembling a list of like-minded capitals. Their interests diverge on defence, trade, sanctions and the degree of distance they are prepared to place between themselves and Washington.
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