The assessment follows the UAE’s decision to leave OPEC and the wider OPEC+ alliance from May 1, ending a membership that began in 1967 and reshaping one of the most influential blocs in the global energy market. The move gives Abu Dhabi greater room to align production with its own capacity targets, after years of friction over quotas that it argued failed to reflect heavy investment in upstream expansion.
Goldman expects the near-term effect to be contained because regional supply flows remain constrained by disruption around the Strait of Hormuz and broader tensions linked to the war involving Iran. That means the removal of OPEC limits does not automatically translate into sharply higher exports. The larger risk, in the bank’s view, lies in what happens when export routes normalise and the UAE is able to deploy additional capacity outside the discipline of collective production targets.
Abu Dhabi has been expanding its oil production base through ADNOC, with a strategic target of reaching 5 million barrels per day of capacity by 2027. Goldman’s base case points to UAE crude production rising to about 3.8 million barrels per day by October 2026, compared with around 3.6 million barrels per day before the conflict-related disruption. The country’s available crude capacity has been estimated at more than 4.5 million barrels per day, giving it room to increase output once market and logistical conditions permit.
The UAE’s departure also weakens OPEC’s claim to manage supply through consensus, particularly at a time when member states and allied producers are already balancing price support against market-share pressures. OPEC’s ability to influence prices has been challenged by non-OPEC growth, especially from the United States, Brazil, Guyana and Canada, while demand growth has become more uneven as China’s economic momentum slows and energy-transition policies reshape long-term consumption patterns.
For Saudi Arabia, the UAE’s exit presents both a strategic and diplomatic test. Riyadh remains the central force within OPEC+ and has repeatedly used voluntary production cuts to support prices, but Abu Dhabi’s decision exposes a widening gap between two Gulf powers with overlapping economic ambitions and different views on how fast producers should monetise reserves. The UAE has argued for production baselines that better reflect its investment, while Saudi Arabia has prioritised cohesion and price management.
Oil markets have so far treated the development as a medium-term supply story rather than an immediate price shock. Brent crude has remained heavily influenced by the security of Gulf shipping lanes, inventory draws and expectations of how long regional disruption will last. Forecasts from major banks now show a wider range of outcomes, with some scenarios pointing to elevated prices if Hormuz-related constraints persist, and others suggesting lower medium-term prices if UAE barrels return freely to the market.
The timing is significant. OPEC+ had already been working through the challenge of unwinding earlier production cuts without triggering a price slump. A producer with the UAE’s spare capacity operating outside the group’s framework could complicate that process. Even if Abu Dhabi increases output gradually, the psychological effect on the market may be larger, as traders price in weaker collective discipline and a higher probability of competition among producers.
For consumers, additional UAE supply could eventually help ease price pressure, particularly in Asia, where refiners remain heavily exposed to Gulf crude. For producers, the risk is that a looser supply environment undermines revenue just as several governments are financing large domestic investment programmes. That tension is likely to shape OPEC+ strategy through the rest of 2026, especially if Russia, Iraq, Kazakhstan and other members push for flexibility of their own.
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