The Guiding Principles for Underwater Infrastructure Defence Exchanges, known as GUIDE, was unveiled on 30 May on the sidelines of the 23rd Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, bringing together countries from Europe, the Middle East, Southeast Asia and Oceania. The initiative is voluntary and does not create new legal or financial obligations, but it sets out shared principles for cooperation among defence establishments supporting civilian agencies and private operators responsible for underwater networks.
The 17 endorsing countries are Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Estonia, Finland, France, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, Qatar, Singapore, Sweden, Thailand and the United Kingdom. The grouping reflects growing concern that the infrastructure running beneath the world’s seas has become both economically indispensable and strategically vulnerable.
Qatar’s participation gives the framework a Gulf dimension at a time when energy security, digital connectivity and maritime stability are increasingly linked. Doha has invested heavily in global energy supply chains, liquefied natural gas infrastructure and digital networks, making the resilience of undersea systems a direct national and regional interest. The country was represented at the Shangri-La Dialogue by Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of State for Defence Affairs Sheikh Saoud bin Abdulrahman bin Hassan bin Ali Al Thani.
Critical underwater infrastructure includes submarine telecommunications cables, power cables, oil and gas pipelines, and associated landing stations and repair facilities. Subsea cables carry more than 95 per cent of global internet and data traffic, while underwater energy systems support electricity transmission, offshore production and hydrocarbon flows. Damage to a single cable can slow communications, disrupt financial activity and complicate emergency response, especially when repairs take place beyond territorial waters.
Singapore’s Defence Minister Chan Chun Sing said at the launch that waterways are no longer only routes for trade but also corridors for energy and telecommunications systems. He warned that disruption to one part of a network can affect the wider system, underlining the need for countries to build norms for maintaining and protecting infrastructure beneath the sea.
GUIDE sets out five broad principles. It recognises underwater infrastructure as critical infrastructure, calls for respect for sovereignty and international law, promotes cooperation among governments, operators and maritime stakeholders, affirms that civilian authorities and private operators retain primary responsibility, and encourages voluntary practical cooperation by defence establishments.
The framework also identifies areas where countries may work together. These include dialogue and exchange of best practices, better awareness of international law and norms, inter-regional information-sharing, technical exchanges, incident response coordination and wider awareness-building among governments, industry and academia. Defence forces could support civilian authorities through maritime surveillance, ships, aircraft and unmanned underwater systems, subject to national laws and operational priorities.
The launch comes after a series of incidents that have focused attention on the vulnerability of undersea networks, particularly in the Baltic Sea, Red Sea and parts of Asia. Cable cuts and pipeline damage have exposed gaps in attribution, surveillance and response. Repairing infrastructure at sea can require specialist vessels, complex permits and coordination across jurisdictions, while deliberate sabotage can be difficult to distinguish from accidental damage caused by anchors, fishing activity or natural events.
The framework’s cross-regional design is significant because subsea systems rarely fit neatly within national borders. A telecommunications cable linking Asia, the Middle East and Europe may pass through multiple jurisdictions, exclusive economic zones and open seas. Energy infrastructure faces similar exposure, with offshore fields, export routes and interconnectors depending on secure maritime operating environments.
The absence of the United States and China from the initial list of endorsing states also highlights the limits of the initiative. Both powers are central to global digital infrastructure, maritime security and strategic competition. Their non-participation does not prevent the framework from operating, but it may affect how far GUIDE can shape wider norms unless more countries join follow-on initiatives.
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